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Durabilité des biens de consommation et marché concurrentiel : une modélisation multi-
agents 
Résumé 
Cet article présente un modèle de simulation multi-agents qui explore la dynamique de durée 
de  vie  des  produits  sur  un  marché  concurrentiel.  L’objectif  principal  de  cet  exercice  de 
modélisation est d’étudier les conditions sous lesquelles une stratégie d’allongement de la 
durée  de  vie  des  produits  peut  être  efficace.  Dans  ce  modèle,  le  changement  dans  les 
caractéristiques des produits s’opère selon un processus stochastique endogène qui repose 
sur les interactions entre des firmes et des consommateurs hétérogènes. La contribution 
principale  de  cet  article  est  de  proposer  une  modélisation  détaillée  de  la  demande 
permettant d’analyser plus en profondeur comment les décisions de consommateurs dotés 
d’une  rationalité  limitée  peuvent  influencer  la  dynamique  du  système  et,  en  particulier, 
comment leur processus d’achat agit sur les stratégies des firmes ainsi que sur la sélection 
qui s’opère sur le marché. Tandis que la plupart des travaux portant sur la durée de vie des 
produits étudient le marché d’un monopole, notre modèle met en avant au contraire que la 
concurrence et la diversité comptent. La coexistence sur le marché de produits concurrents 
présentant des durées de vie hétérogènes est à même d’inciter les firmes à allonger la durée 
de vie de leur produit. Nos résultats mettent également en évidence le rôle clé des processus 
gouvernant la décision d’achat des consommateurs au sein de la dynamique de marché. Le 
comportement d’achat des consommateurs en lui-même guide les stratégies des firmes et in 
fine façonne la structure du marché. 
 
Mots-clés : dynamique industrielle ; obsolescence; durabilité des produits; durée de vie des 
produits; modèle de simulation; consommation durable  
 
Durability of consumption goods and market competition: an agent-based modelling  
Abstract 
This paper presents an agent-based simulation model that explores the dynamics of product 
lifetimes  on  a  competitive  market.  The  main  objective  of  this  modelling  exercise  is  to 
investigate the conditions under which product-life extension strategies can be effective. In 
this model, change in products’ characteristics is driven by an endogenous stochastic process 
relying  on  the  interplays  between  heterogeneous  consumers  and  firms.  The  main 
contribution of the paper is to present a detailed modeling of demand which enables to 
analyze  more  thoroughly  how  decisions  of  bounded  rational  consumers  impact  on  the 
dynamics  of  the  system  and,  more  particularly,  how  purchase  process  shapes  market 
selection  and  strategies  of  firms.  While  most  existing  literature  on  product  lifetime 
investigates durable goods monopolists, our study highlights that competition and diversity 
matter. The coexistence of competing products with different lifetimes can encourage firms 
to market long lifetime products. Our results also stress the critical role played in market 
dynamics by the processes driving purchase decision. The purchasing behavior of consumers 
in itself will greatly guide firms’ strategies and in fine shape market structure. 
Keywords:  industrial  dynamics;  obsolescence;  product  durability;  product  lifetimes; 
simulation model; sustainable consumption 
JEL: O33, D11, D21, Q57 
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1. Introduction 
Products’ lifetime is a critical aspect of consumer society and growing environmental concerns 
make this factor a key issue for sustainable consumption.  
We define product’s lifetime as the period over which the product is used by its owner(s). This 
is the physical lifetime of the product. We will focus in this paper on durable products defined as 
consumption goods that do not quickly wear out. They yield utility over time rather than being 
completely  consumed  in  one  use.  Typical  examples  are  cars,  home  appliances  or  consumer 
electronics.  
Consumer may drop out its current product to buy a new one for two main reasons: because it 
is  out  of  order  or  because  it  does  not  satisfy  consumer’s  expectations  anymore.  In  fact,  every 
consumer is characterized by a requirement level concerning its product attributes (Simon, 1955, 
1956), and when its product no longer meets this requirement level, consumer may want to change 
it in order to acquire a new product more consistent with its preferences (Katona, 1975; Van Raaij et 
Gianotten, 1990; Marell et al., 1995).  
Despite growing attention about environmental consequences of consumption
1, there is no 
recent empirical study measuring product-life trends (Cooper, 2004, 2005). The last comprehensive 
study dates from 1982 (OECD, 1982). The main reason is the lack of available data (Antonides, 1990; 
Conn, 1977; Cooper, 1994; OECD, 1982). According to Bayrus (1998, p.764) “Empirically, it is very 
difficult to rigorously examine product lifetimes, since detailed data for the entire product life-cycle 
and at all the various product market levels are generally difficult to acquire. Consequently, very 
limited  empirical  information  on  product  lifetimes  for  any  particular  industry  is  available  in  the 
literature”. In recent years, some assessments of product lifetimes have been undertaken in relation 
to  waste  reduction  (Cooper,  1994;  Heiskanen,  1996),  the  marketing  of  long  lifetime  products 
(Kostecki, 1998) or second-hand markets (Gregson and Crewe, 2003; Thomas, 2003), but empirical 
research in this area remains poor. Even if there is no empirical proof based on large data base 
(Bayrus,  1998),  most  existing  studies  show  that  product  lifetimes  are  declining  (Kostecki,  1998; 
Cooper and Mayers, 200; Slade, 2006). The main current problem is that firms and consumers tend 
to replace their products more and more frequently leading to increasing quantities of waste and to 
greater pressure on natural resources. The rapid development of mass production and consumption 
goes with increasing product obsolescence which will in fine shortens the product replacement cycle 
both by firms and consumers (Reisch, 2001; Nelson, 1967; Dhebar, 1995; Fernandez, 2001). For 
instance,  during  a  typical  five  year  period,  two  thirds  of  U.S.  manufacturing  firms  switch  their 
products (Bernard et al., 2003), while in Japan consumers replace their phone cell in average every 
year  (Slade,  2006).  While  a  large  part  of  firms  shorten  their  products’  lifetime  (deliberately  or 
because  of  acceleration of  technological  and  styling  changes),  some  competitors  implement  the 
opposite strategy, that is extending product’s lifetime. Typical examples are Dyson and Kia offering 
extended warranty for their products, or Aura which markets high pressure sodium lamps with an 
estimated lifetime of 48.000 hours while most of competitors’ lamps last up to 15.000 hours. It is 
attractive, therefore, to consider under which conditions product-life extension strategies could be 
effective  in  a  competitive  market.  This  is  the  main  purpose  of  this  article  which  explores  the 
dynamics of product lifetimes in an agent based simulation model. In this model, change in products’ 
characteristics  is  driven  by  an  endogenous  stochastic  process  relying  on  the  interplays  between 
heterogeneous consumers’ attributes and firms’ strategies. Noting that the demand side of markets 
is  generally  neglected  in  literature  on  market  dynamics,  we  developed  a  detailed  modeling  of 
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demand which enables us to analyze more thoroughly how consumers’ attributes impact on the 
dynamics of the system and, more particularly, how purchase process shapes market selection and 
strategies of firms. This is done in a bounded rationality context à la Simon (Simon, 1982) in which 
agents facing uncertainty are not able to optimize their choice. Our purpose is to test in such context 
the relative dynamic efficiency of product-life extension strategies. 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  present  the  key  issue  of  product 
obsolescence and the role of demand. In section 3 we present the model. In section 4 we present 
some simulation results with an increasing degree of complexity in the assumptions so as to both 
understand the basic dynamics of the system and to exhibit general findings. In section 5 we draw 
some final conclusions. 
2. Product obsolescence and demand 
The  key  factor  explaining  the  shortening  of  product  replacement  cycle  is  product 
obsolescence.  Product  obsolescence  can  be  defined  as  the  relative  loss  in  value  due  to  quality 
improvements  or  styling  changes  in  subsequent  versions  of  the  product.  “In  markets  where 
technological improvements and styling changes are frequent, product obsolescence is an important 
phenomenon because consumers are reluctant to invest in a product that can soon be superseded” 
(Levinthal and Purohit, 1989, p.35). In this way, the decline in product lifetimes can be explained by 
the acceleration of technological and styling changes. It leads consumers to change more frequently 
their product to hold the most up to date version. Firms can also deliberately design a product with a 
limited useful life, so it will become obsolete after a certain planned period. Planned obsolescence 
strategy aims to generate long-term sales volume by reducing the time between repeat purchases. 
The rationale behind this approach is that additional sales revenue would more than offset both the 
additional costs of research and development needed to develop a new product and opportunity 
costs  of  existing  product  cannibalization.  This  can  be  a  risky  strategy  in  a  competitive  industry 
because consumers may decide to buy a longer lifetime product from competitors. Because of this, 
planned obsolescence strategy would be effective in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets and/or if 
consumers are fooled on the actual cost per use of the product in comparison to the competitors.  
Many theoretical models focus on this question. They investigate optimal durability (Swan, 
1970, 1971; Sieper and Swan, 1973) and establish the conditions under which it would be optimal for 
the monopolist to switch its current product. They focus on time inconsistency (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 
1982, 1986; Waldman 1993, 1996a; Choi, 1994; Fishman and Rob, 2000), adverse selection (Akerlof, 
1970; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999a), network externalities (Waldman 1993, Choi, 1994) or new product 
introductions with technological change (Levinthal and Purohit, 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998; 
Lee and Lee, 1998)
2. Existing literature on durability choice investigates durable goods monopolists in 
two-period equilibrium models to distinguish new and used products. They generally conclude that 
durable goods monopolist typically underinvests in durability so that products’ lifetime is below its 
optimal level (Waldman, 1996b; Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999b; Kim, 1989; Anderson and Ginsburgh, 
1994). “By reducing durability below the efficient level and thus the quality of used units below that 
level, the monopolist reduces the substitutability between new and used units, which, in turn, allows 
the firm to increase the price of new units” (Waldman, 2003, p.138). Since the presence of some 
monopoly power is crucial to their arguments, these models invariably study monopoly markets. 
“However, obsolescence appears to be a feature that also arises in industries that have competitive 
elements (even though they may not be perfectly competitive), such as the often-cited example of 
annual model changes in the automobile industry” (Grout and Park, 2005, p.596). In addition, since 
they  almost  consider  only  two  time  period,  these  models  cannot  generate  extended  industrial 
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dynamics that would be used to investigate how and why firms’ strategies and consumers’ behavior 
evolve through time. It is attractive, therefore, to study the product-life factor in a competitive 
market  where  firms  and  consumers  interplay  over  a  large  number  of  time  periods.  This  is  the 
purpose of this article. Most of literature on market dynamics focuses on the supply side of markets 
and demand is either neglected or considered exogenous. For this reason, studies on technological 
change  generally  assume  homogeneous  products.  We  propose  in  this  paper  a  more  detailed 
modeling of demand enabling us to study heterogeneous consumers facing heterogeneous products. 
In fact, consumers are not passive spectators in product obsolescence phenomenon. They play an 
active  role  trough  their  preferences  about  products  features.  In  the  current  mass  consumption 
context,  consumers  want more,  better,  faster  (Slade,  2006)  and  contribute  then  to  shorten  the 
product  replacement  cycle  by  demanding  to  own  the  newest  product  to  date.  In  particular, 
consumers increasingly assign to product a "novelty value" associated with owning a brand new 
product (Stahel and Jackson, 1993). In this context, agents often change their current product, not 
because it is worn out or defective, but because they are tired of it (Van Hinte, 1997; Cooper, 2005). 
But at the same time, some consumers can give special importance to product reliability or durability 
and  will  be  more  inclined  to  buy  long  lifetime  products,  giving  rise  to  a  niche  market  for  such 
products. Heterogeneity in consumers’ attributes is then a crucial aspect of market selection. By 
offering the opportunity to model interactions between heterogeneous agents over a large number 
of periods, agent-based modeling is an efficient tool to propose a relevant representation of market 
dynamics. 
The consumer's modeling proposed in the following is based on Simon’s bounded rational 
behavior  (Simon,  1982).  Consumers  are  assumed  to  not  consistently  select  the  optimal  product 
maximizing their utility. In fact, most final consumer purchases concern goods with relatively minor 
significance in respect to the overall life of a person and in general consumers are not perfectly 
informed on all the different features of the product they purchase. In addition, when consumers buy 
the “wrong” product (i.e. a dominated alternative compared to the optimal choice), there is no 
economic penalty which could push them to either correct their choice or to leave the market. 
Consequently, consumers can be assumed to not devote a lot of time and attention to collect and 
use all the relevant information about available products’ features in order to make optimal purchase 
decision. They rather behave following specific satisficing rules which could lead them to select a 
suboptimal alternative, more expensive or with a lower quality than the optimal choice, but far 
easier to be decided upon
3.  
The  demand  model  proposed  sheds  light  on  firms-consumers  interactions  that  will  shape 
market  dynamics.  In  particular,  it  will  enable  us  to  explore  the  conditions  leading  to  effective 
product-life extension strategies. The model that follows is kept as simple as possible so that we can 
easily focus on this particular question. 
3. The model 
We consider the market of a generic durable product. We take into account two categories of 
agents: firms (i) producing and marketing finished products and end consumers (j) buying those 
products. Every firm is assumed to supply one single type of product at the same time
4 and every 
consumer is assumed to use one single product at the same time. There is nor exit of agent neither 
entry of new agent in the model. 
 
                                                      
3 For a more detailed discussion on this question see Valente (2003a, 2003b). 
4 Consequently, i represents the product as well as the producer.  Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
Product modelling 
Every  product  is  modelled  as  a  vector  of  characteristics  which  determine  its  quality  level 
(Lancaster, 1966; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984). Every characteristic is represented by a positive real 
number;  the  higher  this  number,  the  higher  the  product  performance  on  this  particular 
characteristic.  In  this  paper  we  assume that  products  are  defined  by  three characteristics:  their 
cheapness,  defined  as  the  inverse  of  price  (1/p),  their  technical  quality  (X)  and  their  reliability, 
defined as their lifetime (L).  
X is a multi-criterion dimension reflecting the performance of the technical attributes of the 
product during the use phase. X is a synthetic index which increases in proportion to the overall 
technical quality of the product. 
L is the maximum number of periods over which the product can be used. For instance if L = 2, 
the product can be used over 2 consecutive periods, then it breaks and must be replaced. 
We assume a positive relation between technical quality and price and also between reliability 
and price: the higher the technical quality and/or the reliability of the product, the more expensive it 
will  be.  In  this  paper,  we  do  not  focus  on  the  supply  side  and  consequently,  in  order  to  not 
unnecessarily complicate the model, we consider a very simplified production process. In particular, 
we do not focus on the processes occurring in firms’ strategies to set their price.  We consider a very 
simple price setting process and we model price by applying the very simple following rule: 
t , i t , i t , i L . X p =   (1) 
Following this equation, for a given level of technical quality, the price per period of use is 
identical for all the products. Note that the absolute values for products’ qualities are not important 
because the procedure used (see “Purchase decision process”) requires only to compare for each 
characteristic whether one product is superior, inferior or equivalent to another product. In this way, 
a  product  is  absolutely  superior  to  another  one  only  if  all  the  values  constituting  its  vector  of 
characteristics are superior to all the values in the vectors of the other competing products. Such a 
representation allows to take to into account trade-offs amongst product characteristics since some 
products will score better than competitors on certain characteristics but worse on others. 
The whole set of values in the vectors of characteristics are chosen so that all the products 
available satisfy the minimal conditions for being considered for an actual purchase by all consumers. 
In particular, prices are set so that they do not exceed reserve price of any consumer.  
Purchase decision process 
As noticed in section 2, we model consumer decision in a bounded rationality context à la 
Simon in which consumers are assumed to follow satisficing rules which could lead them to buy a 
suboptimal product, but far easier to be decided upon. 
In our model we assume that each consumer purchases and then uses one single product at 
the same time. Consumers renew their product only when this product is at the end of its lifetime (L) 
or when it becomes obsolete. In fact, we assume that consumers can renew their product (before its 
end of life) when it is still in working order because the technical quality (X) of this product do not 
satisfy their expectations anymore. Thus, renewal decisions rely on satisficing rules: only consumers 
owning a product with an unsatisfactory level of technical quality will choose to change it. The 
modelling  of  these  renewal  decisions  is  based  on  obsolescence  probabilities  depending  on  the 
technical quality (X) of the products currently used by consumers in the current period. The higher 
the technical quality of the product, the less likely it will be considered as obsolete. Thus, consumer j Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
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Xj is the technical quality of the product owned by consumer j, MinX and MaxX are the best 
and the worst technical quality of the products currently used by consumers on the market in the 
current period and x is a parameter reflecting the maximum obsolescence probability
5. 
This product renewal will have a negative impact on the environment. In fact, each time a 
consumer  renews  its  product,  the  old  one  becomes  an  end-of-life  product  which  increases  the 
quantity  of waste  to  be  collected  and  treated.  In  addition,  manufacturing  the  new  product  will 
consume energy and resources which will increase the environmental burden. We have to notice 
that we take into account neither the environmental impact of the product during its use phase nor 
its recyclability. In fact, if the new product is more energy efficient than the old one or if it is made 
with less unrecyclable materials, this will have a positive impact on the environment. As we only 
focus on the product-life factor, we will not take into account these effects
6.  
Product-life  extension  could  lead  to  rebound  effects  since,  compared  to  short  lifetime 
products, long lifetime products will give their owners the opportunity to save money over the 
additional period of use and this money can then be spent to buy other (polluting) products. As we 
consider a single market and we assume that consumers own one single product at the same time, 
this issue will not be explicitly discussed in our model. 
When buying a new product, consumers will make their choice depending on their preferences 
with respect to products’ characteristics: X, L and 1/p. In fact, in our model consumers are over all 
defined  according  to  their  preferences  towards  products’  characteristics.  To  simplify  the  model 
dynamics we assume that preferences are exogenous and cannot change trough time
7. The crucial 
point is to determine how to explicitly represent the choosing process. Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
(1996) argue convincingly that human behavior regarding decision making can be represented by the 
Take-The-Best  strategy  (TTB).  This  strategy  is  indeed  supported  by  experimental  observation  of 
actual  people’s  behavior  and  it  appears  to  be  very  efficient  when  facing  uncertainty  and  poor 
available information. In our case, we consider the choosing process consisting of selecting one 
product among several options, each defined over a set of characteristics. The TTB strategy is then 
composed by the three following steps (Valente, 2003b): 
1.  The consumer evaluates the available products on the only basis of her preferred 
product characteristic. 
2.  If one single product scores highest in respect of that characteristic, the consumer 
chooses this product. 
3.  Otherwise,  if  more  than  one  option  scores  similarly,  the  consumer  removes  the 
dominated options and restarts from 1. with the second preferred characteristic. 
                                                      
5 Consumers owning a product with the highest performance will have an obsolescence probability equal to zero, those owning a product 
with the lowest performance will have the maximum probability x. 
6 For a more detailed discussion on product recyclability and lifetime see Brouillat (2009a, b). 
7 For a detailed discussion on preferences origins and for a modeling of endogenous consumers’ preferences see Valente (2003a, 2003b). Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
Consumer’s individual preferences are then defined as the order in which characteristics are 
used  in  the  TTB  strategy.  We  assume  that  each  consumer  can  establish  a ranking  on  products’ 
characteristics  depending  on  their  relative  importance  in  the  purchase  decision.  We  will  then 
consider six possible ranking representing six consumer preferences sets (table 1). 
Table 1. Consumer categories 
Consumer 
category 




X > L > 1/p  X > 1/p > L  L > X > 1/p  L > 1/p > X  1/p > X > L  1/p > L > X 
It is possible that at the end of the TTB process there are still several remaining products. In 
this case, we assume that the consumer will choose randomly its product amongst these remaining 
options. Regarding this random draw we will test two possibilities. In the first one, every remaining 
product  has  the  same  probability  to  be  chosen.  In  the  second  case,  we  take  into  account  a 
bandwagon effect (Lebeinstein, 1976) where every remaining product has a probability to be chosen 
proportional to its market share. This bandwagon effect reflects social influences in the purchase 
decision since consumers will prefer products that are more diffused. 
The  TTB  algorithm  respects  the  principles  of  bounded  rationality  and  is  in  line  with  the 
experimental evidence that, facing different alternatives, people resolve the conflict by selecting the 
alternative that is superior on the more important dimension (Shafir et al, 1993; Slovic, 1975, 1990; 
Tversky et al, 1988).  
An  important  point  is  that  this  type  of  choosing  process  does  not  allow  compensations 
amongst product’s characteristics. That is, a weak product on the first characteristic will be removed 
even if it is very powerful on the other characteristics. In particular, if consumers are almost “price 
oriented” buyers, long lifetime but expensive products can be quickly discarded even if they are cost 
effective in the long run, i.e. their price per period of use (p/L) is the same than cheaper short 
lifetime products. 
Nevertheless, when evaluating the available products in respect of a characteristic, we assume 
that consumers use a tolerance margin to compare each alternative with the optimal one. We call 
the generic value 
k
i v the measure of product i in respect of characteristic k, 
k
max v the optimal level 




i m.v v ³ the 




i v v » ). So, the 
lower m, the more consumers are “tolerant”. This tolerance margin is used by consumers to avoid 
discarding products that are very slightly inferior in the first stages of the TTB algorithm but much 
better in respect of further aspects (Valente, 2003b). It is also a way to take into account imperfect 
information and bounded rationality which will prevent consumers to perfectly identify the best 
available product on a given characteristic.  
Once the consumer has bought the product of his preference, she becomes a customer of the 
selected firm. From the firm's point of view, each time its product is bought, an additional sale is 
recorded and its stock of customers will increase by one unit. On the other hand, when one of its 
customers decides to change its product, the firm records a loss and so its stock of customers will 
drop by one unit. At the end of the purchase cycle, each firm counts the number of sales (Q) and the 
number  of  lost  users  (LOST)  and  consequently  determines  the  current  number  of  users  of  that 
product, i.e. its stock of customers (U): Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
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S     (4) 
Firm strategy 
To not needlessly complicate the model, we limit the dynamics at work on the supply side. As 
we noticed previously every firm is assumed to supply one single type of product at the same time. 
We model an adaption process where firm’s strategy consists in choosing freely the characteristics of 
its product; i.e. the level of its technical quality and its lifetime; within a given admissible range. We 
assume that this operation is free of cost and is instantaneous: once the firm has chosen the features 
of its product, it is able to market it. We do not model any innovation process consisting in gradually 
improving product’s characteristics.  
Firms' strategies may change over time in order to fit their behaviour to the fluctuations of the 
market environment. In fact, depending on market feedbacks and their economic performance, firms 
may decide to change their product feature to increase their market share. Firms’ strategies are then 
characterized by a learning process divided into two steps (Silverberg and Verspagen, 1995). The first 
step determines if the firm wants to change its product’s characteristics, while the second fixes the 
new characteristics adopted. This learning process is based on a Simonian approach of bounded 
rationality  so  that  firms  take  their  decisions  according  to  satisficing  rules:  only  the  firms  with 
unsatisfactory market share levels will choose to change their strategy. Firms will decide then to 
change their strategy with probabilities proportional to their market share (Si) and the best and the 











t t i, Change
t i, Smin Smax
Smin S
1 α. Prob   (5) 
Parameter α is the maximal probability. Thus, the higher its market share, the less likely the 
firm will change its strategy. If the draw is a success, the firm will review its strategy; if not, the firm 
retains its strategy from the previous period. 
Once the firm has decided to change its strategy, it randomly selects a firm in the economy 
with probabilities proportional to firms' market share. Once the firm has chosen the competitor to 
imitate, it adopts the strategy of this firm by imitating the value of its product’s features X and L and 
markets then the same product. 
4. Simulation results 
We will present in this section successive simulation experiments with an increasing degree of 
complexity
8. The objective is first of all to understand the basic dynamics of the system before 
gradually complicating the model to obtain more relevant and general findings. We will study several 
                                                      
8 We used the Laboratory for Simulation Development platform to compute and run the model. This simulation platform is develop by 
Marco Valente (2008) and is downloadable for free at the following address: www.labsimdev.org. Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
successive  model  settings,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex.  In  every  model  setting,  we 
formalize 1200 consumers. The number of firms will depend on the model experiment. 
Tolerance margin and “capturing effect” of demand 
The objective of this first experiment is to consider the most simplified version of the model to 
investigate its very basic dynamics. 
In this simulation experiment, we formalize 4 firms. We assume that firms’ strategies are fixed 
(α = 0 in equation 5). In other words, firms cannot change the characteristics of their product. These 
characteristics are presented in table 2. On this basis, we will distinguish two types of firms: those 
marketing short lifetime products (firms 1 and 3) and those marketing long lifetime products (firms 2 
and 4). 
Regarding the demand side, obsolescence probabilities are null for all the consumers (x = 0 in 
equation 2). Consequently consumers renew their product only when this product is at the end of its 
lifetime. There is also no bandwagon effect: if there are still several remaining options at the end of 
the TTB, every remaining product has the same probability to be chosen. 
Table 2. Distribution of products characteristics 
  Firm 1  Firm 2  Firm 3  Firm 4 
Technical 
quality (X) 
2  1  1  2 
Lifetime (L)  1  2  1  2 
Product’s 
characteristics 
Price (p)  2  2  1  4 
We will consider three values for the tolerance margin of consumers: m = 1, 0.5 and 0.25. In 
each case, we run 100 simulations of 50 periods each with an initial random draw for the relative 
share of each consumer category (table 1). We will discuss simulation results using boxplots
9.  
Boxplots  on  figure  1  represent  the  distribution  of  firms’  market  shares.  When  m  =  1, 
consumers can perfectly identify the best available product for a given characteristic. In this case, 
they can perfectly identify the product which fits the best with their first preferences and they will 
always select the same product. Consequently firms’ market shares are fixed for a given simulation 
run. Consumers A and C always buy the product of firm 4, consumers B the product of firm 1, 
consumers D the product of firm 2 and consumers E and F buy the product of firm 3. If we note zh the 
share of consumers h in the total population of consumers (h = {A, B, C, D, E, F}), the distribution of 
firms’ market shares is the following: S1 = zB; S2 = zD; S3 = zE + zF; S4 = zA + zC. There is no uncertainty 
about the economic performance of firms: they only depend on the relative share of each consumer 
category. Thus, the dispersion in firms’ market shares is only explained by the difference in the 
relative share of each consumer category across the 100 scenarii. 
 
                                                      
9 A boxplot gives the quartiles of the distribution of the considered variable as well as its maximal and minimal values. We control 
significant differences between series with Student T tests. Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   









































Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
m = 0.25
 
When m = 0.5, the threshold values under which products are removed are 1 for X and L and 
0.5 for 1/p. All the firms market a product with X and L ≥ 1, but firm 4 is the only one with 1/p < 0.5. 
Consequently, the product of firm 4 is always discarded and its market share is null. The three other 
competitors will share the total demand, but we observe that the market share of firm 2 is much 
higher than those of firm 1 and 3. This better economic performance is directly linked to the longer 
lifetime of its product. This makes it possible to keep customers over a longer period given that they 
will not be captured by other firms during the time they are using that product. Over the same period, 
firm 2 can “capture” customers from firms marketing shorter lifetime products, namely firm 1 and 3. 
Customers belonging to these firms have to renew their product more often and so, they will tend to 
be, more often than not, in search of a new product. Consequently they will be inevitably more 
inclined to be captured by other firms. Thus, whatever the distribution of consumer categories, firm 
2 can manage to gain much greater customer numbers. We will call this phenomenon the “capturing 
effect”.  By  focusing  demand  on  long  lifetime  products,  this  effect  reduces  dispersion  in  market 
shares. In other words, the capturing effect reduces the impact of consumers’ preferences on firms’ 
economic performance. 
When m = 0.25, the threshold values under which products are removed are 0.5 for X and L 
and 0.25 for 1/p. Consequently, whatever consumers’ preferences, no product is removed and there 
are still the four competing products at the end of the TTB process. Consumers will randomly choose 
their product amongst these four options with equal probabilities. We can observe that firms 2 and 4 
manage to obtain higher market shares thanks to the capturing effect related to the longer lifetime 
of their product, as explained above.  
These very first results clearly denote that the success of product-life extension strategies will 
sorely  depend  on  the  level  of  the  tolerance  margin.  In  particular,  they  show  that  long  lifetime 
products can be successful even if there is no direct demand for this type of product. In fact, if we 
consider the particular case where product lifetime is a first-class purchase criteria for no one (zC = zD 
= 0 and zA = zB = zE = zF = 0.25), when consumers have no tolerance margin (m = 1) the market share 
of firm 2 is obviously null. But when consumers have a tolerance margin (m = 0,5 or m = 0,25), the 
capturing effect comes into play and the market share of firm 2 far exceed those of firms marketing a 
short lifetime product, even if product-life remain at best a second-class purchase criteria (figure 2). Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   


































































This  first  experiment  highlights  how  the  purchase  decision  process  of  consumers  impacts 
market dynamics. Consumers’ preferences (their ranking on products’ characteristics) are obviously a 
key factor, but our results also emphasize the crucial role played by the basic mechanisms leading 
the  purchase  decision.  They  are  reflected  in  particular  by  the  tolerance  margin  parameter.  By 
introducing a degree of uncertainty in the purchase choice of consumers, this margin gives rise to a 
capturing effect of demand, which will have critical impact on economic performance of firms, in 
particular those marketing long lifetime products. We have to notice that diversity in firms’ strategies 
is a determining factor in the dynamics as the capturing effect appears only if there are several 
available products with different lifetimes. If all the products on the market exhibit the same lifetime, 
the effect totally vanishes. Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
We  add  now  a  band  wagon  effect  to  take  into  account  social  influences  in  the  purchase 
process. The band wagon effect intensifies the capturing effect of product-life extension (figure 3) 
since  at  the  end  of  the  TTB  process  every  remaining  product  has  a  probability  to  be  chosen 
proportional to its market share. 



































Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
m = 0.25
 
The economic advantage of firms marketing long lifetime products is reinforced leading to a 
firm 2 monopoly when m = 0.5 and to a firm 2 – firm 4 symmetric duopoly when m = 0.25
10. 
This market domination of long lifetime products will have direct influence on consumers’ 
welfare (figure 4). Consumers’ surplus will be impacted. It is a purely pecuniary indicator of welfare 
since individual surplus is calculated as the difference between the reserve price of the agent and the 
price of the product purchased at the current period
11. To not unnecessarily obscuring the basic logic 
of the model, we assume that all consumers have the same reserve price which is the price of the 
most expensive product on the market, so that each consumer can buy any available product. Since 
long lifetime products are more expensive (see equation 1), their diffusion leads to a decrease in 
consumers’ surplus which will have negative impact on their welfare. However, only considering 
pecuniary surplus as a measure of welfare is a very narrow vision. Consumers’ welfare also depends 
on non-pecuniary aspects, in particular environmental protection. By reducing the amount of waste 
(figure 4), the diffusion of long lifetime product will have a positive impact on the environment and in 
turn on welfare, which will counterbalance its negative effect on surplus. Nevertheless, we do not try 
to aggregate pecuniary surplus and environment protection to calculate a synthetic quantitative 
estimation for the net impact of long lifetime products on consumers’ welfare. In fact, estimating the 
weights of the different heterogeneous elements that enter into the assessment of welfare is a very 
complex and arguable issue which is beyond the scope of this article
12. 
 
                                                      
10 The Student T test with 1% probability shows no significant difference between the two series Firm 2 and Firm 4. 
11 This means that if the consumer does not buy any product over the period, its surplus is maximal, equals to its reserve price. 
12 Moreover, this task is even tricky than we model products with heterogeneous technical qualities. This will have an impact on welfare 
since owning a high-tech product would provide greater satisfaction than owing a low-tech one, ceteris paribus. Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   




























































Starting from the previous configuration of the model, we will investigate is this section the 
impact of product obsolescence on market dynamics. To this end, we will consider two levels for the 
parameter x reflecting the sensitivity of consumers to product obsolescence: a low value (x = 0.1) and 
a high value (x = 0.9). 
Regarding  economic  performance  of  firms,  product  obsolescence  has  no  impact  on  the 
dynamics when m = 1: firms’ market shares are fixed because every consumer will always select the 
same  product.  When  consumers  have  a  tolerance  margin,  product  obsolescence  will  affect  the 
distribution of market shares (figure 5). If m = 0.5, only a high sensitivity of consumers to product 
obsolescence will impact the market structure: firm 2 will share the demand with firms marketing 
short lifetime products (firms 1 and 3), but the market domination of firm 2 remains very strong. If m 
= 0.25, as in the previous case, only firms marketing long lifetime products (firms 2 and 4) will share 
the demand, but product obsolescence will lead now to unbalanced market shares. In fact, due to 
the difference in the technical quality of their products, sensitivity of consumers to obsolescence will 
favour firm 4 whereas it will handicap firm 2. The more they are sensitive to product obsolescence, 
the more customers of firm 2 will change their product before its end of life and the more likely they 
will be to be captured by firm 4. In other words, product obsolescence reinforces the capturing effect 
of product-life extension for firms marketing a high-tech product. We obtain then a firm 4 monopoly 
when consumers are very sensitive to obsolescence (x = 0.9).  
From an environmental point of view, figure 6 obviously shows that product obsolescence 
increase the amount of waste, which will negatively affect agents’ welfare. The best situation is 
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Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
m = 0.25 ; x = 0.9
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The average technical quality of the products sold will mechanically rise with the sensitivity of 
consumers to obsolescence, which would have a positive impact on their welfare. But regarding 
consumers’ surplus, figure 7 clearly shows that product obsolescence has a negative impact since it 
encourages consumers to both renew more frequently their product and select first and foremost 
more expensive high-tech goods. Even if these goods would provide greater satisfaction than low-
tech  goods, one  can  reasonably  think  that the  negative  effects of  product obsolescence on  the 
environment and consumers’ surplus would dominate, leading in the end to a global negative impact 
on consumers’ welfare. 
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We will investigate in the next section a more complex configuration of the model in order to 
complete these first findings and draw more general conclusions. 
Monte Carlo simulations 
In this simulation experiment, we will explore the properties of the model with a wide range of 
parameter settings. The purpose is to identify some emergent properties and results which can be 
considered as valid for the whole set of parameters. To this end, we will present the results coming 
from a battery of 5000 simulations carried out with a Monte Carlo procedure. This methodology 
enables us to run a high number of simulations with a random setting for the initial values of the 
parameters. It is a way of exploring the parameter space and of emphasizing the variety of the 
possible outcomes of the model without an arbitrary initialization of the parameters. In particular, it 
will enable us to test the effects on the model dynamics of parameters characterizing the demand 
side and to hold out general proposition about their impact on the market. For each simulation run, 
we draw parameter values within the admissible ranges presented in table 3. 
Table 3. Chosen domain for parameters characterizing the demand side in the Monte Carlo 
procedure 
Parameter  Initial value  description 
x  [0 ; 1] 
Maximum obsolescence 
probability (equation 2) 
m  [0 ; 1]  Tolerance margin 
zh 
[0 ; 1] 
with zA + zB + zC + zD + zE + zF = 1 
Share of consumers h in the total 
population of consumers Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
We formalized 16 firms with evolving strategies following the adaptive process described in 
section 3 (Firm strategy)
13. The strategy of a given firm is defined by the characteristics of its product: 
X, L and p. At the beginning of each simulation run, every firm will choose randomly the value for the 
variables X and L and may change it thereafter in order to fit its behaviour to the fluctuations of the 
market environment. To broaden the spectrum of possible firm strategies, we now assume that 
variables  X  and  L  can  take  any  integer  value  between  1  and  4.  In  table  4  we  define  four  firm 
categories based on their product strategy.  
Table 4. Firm categories 
Lifetime (L) 
 
1  2  3  4 
1 
2 
Low-tech products with short 
lifetime (Lowtech-Short) 






High-tech products with short 
lifetime (Hightech-Short) 
High-tech products with long 
lifetime (Hightech-Long) 
Simulation  results  show  that  Lowtech-Short  and  Hightech-Long  strategies  are  generally 
preferred by firms (figure 8). In other words, firms will mostly market either a cheap low quality 
product or on the contrary an expensive high quality good
14.  












































Mean  0.245  0.402  0.135  0.217 
Median  0.187  0.375  0  0 
Maximum  1  1  1  1 
Minimum  0  0  0  0 
Std. Dev.  0.291  0.366  0.240  0.323 
This finding is coherent with our previous results: Lowtech-Short and Hightech-Long products 
will be inclined to be selected by two categories of consumers (consumers E and F for Lowtech-Short 
products and consumers A and C for Hightech-Long products) while Hightech-Short and Lowtech-
                                                      
13 We run simulations with 500 periods each in order to allow sufficient time for evolutionary processes to implement. 
14 We have to remind that every consumer can potentially buy any product on the market. There is not any income constraint that would 
prevent some consumers to buy expensive products. Considering such constraint would obviously affect our results. Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
Long products will be generally preferred only by one single category of consumers (consumers B for 
Hightech-Short products and consumers D for Lowtech-Long products). This will mechanically give an 
advantage to Lowtech-Short and Hightech-Long strategies over the 5000 simulation runs. We can 
also argue that firms would prefer not to adopt the Lowtech-Long strategy because long lifetime 
leads to market quite expensive products and at the same time low technical quality prevents firms 
to benefit from the capturing effect of product-life extension because of product obsolescence. They 
would neither adopt the Hightech-Short strategy for the same reasons: products are quite expensive 
due to their high technical quality and product-life is too short to generate capturing effect. To 
resume, in order to benefit from product-life extension by generating capturing effect of demand, 
firms have to market high-tech products. Otherwise, it is better to market a cheap low-tech product 
with short lifetime.  
Figure 8 shows that firms will generally prefer the Hightech-Long strategy to the Lowtech-
Short’s because the capturing effect that increase market shares only comes into play with the first 
strategy. However, these two strategies are complementary. As we have already noticed, if all the 
products exhibit long lifetimes, the capturing effect totally vanishes. The existence of short lifetime 
products  on  the  market  is  then  deciding  to  justify  the  Hightech-Long  strategy.  This  means  that 
Hightech-Long and Lowtech-Short products will generally coexist and consequently there will not be 
any dominant design on the market. 
To deeper understand these global results and highlight the effects of demand parameters on 
the dynamics, we will use regression trees (figures 9 and 10). A regression tree (Venables and Ripley, 
1999) establishes a hierarchy between independent variables using their contributions to the overall 
fit (R²) of the regression. The tree gives a hierarchical sequence of conditions on the variables of the 
model: the higher the role of a condition in the classification of the observed case, the higher its 
status on the tree. For each condition, the left branch gives the cases for which the condition is true 
and the right branch gives the cases compatible with the complementary condition
15. 
Trees on figure 9 show that the tolerance margin of consumers will have critical influence in 
firms’ strategic choice. When consumers have a large tolerance (i.e. a low value for m), long product-
life strategies will be chosen first because this demand feature allows the capturing effect to be 
effective. More precisely, the Lowtech-Long strategy will be chosen only if consumers are insensitive 
to product obsolescence (x < 0.2661) and m is not too low (0.06466 ≤ m < 0.4898). In fact, when the 
tolerance margin is very large (m < 0.08349) the Hightech-Long strategy is chosen by almost all the 
firms (93.7%). Short product-life strategies will be generally preferred for intermediate values of the 
tolerance margin, when the capturing effect is weakened. When 0.334 ≤ m < 0.4995, almost 50% of 
firms choose the Lowtech-Short strategy, while the Hightech-Short strategy is favoured either by a 
high value for m combined with a large share of consumers B (m ≥ 0.493 and zB ≥ 0.1632) or by an 
intermediate value for m (0.1118 ≤ m < 0.493) combined with a high sensitivity of consumers to 
obsolescence (x ≥ 0.5561).  
Consumers’ preferences appear to be a secondary criterion
16. No surprisingly, firms will be 
incited  to  adopt  the  Lowtech-Short  strategy  when  demand  consist  of  a  quite  large  number  of 
consumers whose product cheapness is the first-class purchase criterion (consumers E and F) while a 
large  share  of  consumers  A  and  B  will  respectively  favor  Hightech-Long  and  Hightech-Short 
                                                      
15 If we consider for instance the Lowtech-Short tree in Figure 9, on the left branch, we have all observations for which m < 0.334. On the 
right branch, we have all observations for which m ≥ 0.334. When m ≥ 0.4995 and ZE ≥ 0.1588, the expected value for the share of firms on 
the market selecting the Lowtech-Short strategy is 36.43% and we have n = 1302 observations corresponding to this case. 
16 On each tree, they come into play on branches corresponding to high values for m, that is to say when consumers are less tolerance 
regarding dominated options at the first stages of the TTB algorithm. Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
strategies. One can also notice that consumers’ preferences do not appear on the Lowtech-Long tree 
meaning that they are not a critical criterion for firms to choose or not the Lowtech-Long strategy. 
Figure 9. Regression trees of firm strategies 







In  line  with these  results,  trees on  figure 10 show  that  the  tolerance margin  is  the most 
determining parameter for both consumers’ surplus and the amount of waste. We observe that low 
values for m will lower consumers’ surplus because of the large diffusion of expensive Hightech-Long 
products, but at the same time it increases environmental quality by reducing the amount of waste. 
Sensitivity  of  consumers  to  product  obsolescence  will  also  affect  these  two  variables:  a  high 
sensitivity will both tend to decrease consumers’ surplus and to increase waste streams. Finally, the 
highest consumers’ surplus are obtained when the tolerance margin is low (m ≥ 0.75) while the 
lowest  values  are  observed  when  the  margin  is  large  (m  <  0.1654).  In  contrast,  the  best 
environmental  performances  are  obtained  with  high  tolerance  margins  (m  <  0.1654)  while  the 
highest waste streams are generated with quite thin margins (m ≥ 0.3338) and high sensitivity to 
product obsolescence (x ≥ 0.6317). 
Figure 10. Regression trees of consumers’ surplus and total amount of waste 
                               
 
 
In the end, this more general experiment confirms and supports the findings of the previous 
simpler model settings showing that market competition and diversity of both supply and demand in 
a bounded rationality context can lead to efficient product-life extension strategies. 
5. Conclusions 
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Existing literature on product lifetime investigates durable goods monopolists in two period 
equilibrium models and generally concludes that firms marketing durable goods typically underinvest 
in product-life so that products’ lifetime is below its optimal level. Our approach differs from these 
models in several aspects and consequently, our results are rather complementary than conflicting.  
We model a competitive market where competition amongst firms occurs over a large number 
of  periods.  We  focus  on  the  interplays  between  heterogeneous  bounded  rational  firms  and 
consumers,  respectively  marketing  and  buying  products  modeled  as  multi-features  technologies 
characterized by their technical quality and their lifetime. We put emphasize on the demand side and 
we represent the purchase decision making process of consumers by the Take-The-Best strategy 
(TTB). This model obviously provides a simplified vision of the problem studied. Real world markets 
are so complex that many aspects of reality have been intentionally neglected and some hypotheses 
being assumed here are fairly restricted. However, despite this simplification in the modelling, our 
simulation exercise yields some interesting conclusions about the product-life factor in industrial 
dynamics. 
First of all, our findings clearly point that competition and diversity matter. The coexistence of 
products with different lifetimes gives rise to a capturing effect of demand for firms marketing long 
lifetime products: the longer lifetime of their product makes possible both to keep customers over a 
longer  period  and  to  capture  customers  from  firms  marketing  shorter  lifetime  products.  This 
capturing effect, by reinforcing the market share of firms choosing to market long lifetime products, 
will justify this last strategy. But this effect occurs only if there are competing products with shorter 
lifetimes. If all the products on the market exhibit the same lifetime or if there is just one single firm, 
the capturing effect vanishes. It will also be effective only if long lifetime products are high-tech 
products too. In fact, consumers are sensitive to product obsolescence and they will keep their 
product only if it is not outdated. To be efficient product-life extension strategies have then to 
primarily involve products with high technical quality.  
This  means  that  long  lifetime  products  will  tend  to  be  more  expensive.  Consequently, 
protecting environment and sustaining consumers’ surplus appear to be contradictory objectives. 
Nevertheless, one can reasonably presume that firms can enjoy economies of scale so that the price 
of long lifetime products would decrease as they are diffusing in the economy.  In addition, the 
surplus is only one particular aspect of consumers’ welfare. Extending product-life will contribute to 
increase consumers’ welfare both by reducing the amount of waste and increasing the technical 
quality of goods in use. 
Our results also highlight the critical role played in market dynamics by the processes driving 
purchase decision. The purchasing behavior of consumers in itself will greatly guide firms’ strategies 
and in fine shape market structure. The TTB algorithm is characterized by a tolerance margin used by 
consumers to compare each alternative with the optimal one in respect of a given product feature. 
By  substantially  shaping  the  behavior  of  consumers  and  in  fine  market  dynamics,  the  tolerance 
margin is the keystone of the consumers’ purchase decision and firms’ strategic choice, more than 
consumers’ preferences. In particular, depending on its value, the tolerance margin will give rise or 
not to the capturing effect of product-life extension, and when consumers are sufficiently “tolerant”, 
marketing  long  lifetime  products  is  efficient  whatever  consumers’  preferences.  Consumers’ 
preferences appear to be a secondary criterion which comes into play when the margin is thin. To 
resume, the model dynamics emphasize that the effectiveness of product-life extension will depend 
on consumers’ preference towards product lifetime and their sensitivity to obsolescence, but it will 
first of all rely on the bounded rational behaviour driving consumers’ purchase decisions.   
This very simple model calls for more research into the modeling of product-life strategies in 
competitive markets. In particular, extending the modeling of both market supply and demand, but Durability of consumption goods and market competition: An agent-based modelling 
   
also developing frameworks that take into account public policies would improve our understanding 
of trends in consumer society and our response to growing environmental concerns. 
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